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III. INTRODUCTION 
 
Plaintiff-Respondent Allen G. Nettleton’s (“Nettleton”) brief asserts that Defendant-
Appellant Canyon Outdoor Media, LLC (“Canyon Outdoor”) was not entitled to submit a motion 
for reconsideration to the trial court. This assertion is contrary to the express language of Idaho 
Rule of Civil Procedure 11(a)(2)(B). As addressed in Canyon Outdoor’s Appellant’s Brief, and 
further addressed below, Canyon Outdoor was permitted to ask the trial court to reconsider its 
Memorandum Decision and Order Re: Cross Motions for Summary Judgment and the trial court 
was required to consider the new and additional information presented with Canyon Outdoor’s 
Motion for Reconsideration. In addition, Nettleton’s assertion that a February 28, 2014 
agreement, which modified the rates at which Nettleton’s variable compensation component 
were paid set forth the entire agreement between the parties is not supported by the record. For 
these reasons, Canyon Outdoor respectfully requests that the Court reverse the trial court’s 
determination that Canyon Outdoor was not entitled to summary judgment, the trial court’s 
determination that Nettleton was entitled to summary judgment, the trial court’s determination 
that Canyon Outdoor was not entitled to an award of costs and attorney’s fees, and the trial 
court’s determination that Nettleton was entitled to an award of costs and attorney’s fees. 
IV. ARGUMENT 
 
A. CANYON OUTDOOR WAS ENTITLED TO FILE A MOTION FOR 
RECONSIDERATION 
 
In this situation, Canyon Outdoor’s Motion for Reconsideration was filed after entry of a 
final judgment and the trial court was required to consider any new admissible evidence or 
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authority bearing on the correctness of the Memorandum Decision and Order Re: Cross Motions 
for Summary Judgment. Fragnella v. Petrovich, 153 Idaho 266, 276, 281 P.3d 103, 113 (2012). 
Nettleton’s statement that Canyon Outdoor “was precluded from moving for reconsideration of 
the order for summary judgment” is contrary to Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 11. See 
Respondent’s Brief at p. 13; I.R.C.P. 11(a)(2)(B). Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 11(a)(2)(B), 
which was in effect when Canyon Outdoor’s Motion for Reconsideration was filed, expressly 
provided that a motion for reconsideration may be brought after entry of a final judgment. 
I.R.C.P. 11(a)(2)(B) A motion for reconsideration of any interlocutory order of the trial court 
may be made at any time before the entry of final judgment, but not later than fourteen days after 
the entry of the final judgment. In re Estate of Lanham, 160 Idaho 89, 93, 369 P.3d 307, 311 (Ct. 
App. 2016) (“A motion to reconsider any order of the trial court entered before final judgment 
may be made at any time prior to or within 14 days after the entry of a final judgment.”)1 In re 
Estate of Lanham did not provide a basis for the trial court to decline to rule on Canyon 
Outdoor’s Motion for Reconsideration. The facts presented in In re Estate of Lanham are distinct 
from the facts in this matter and cannot be reconciled. There the Idaho Court of Appeals held that 
when a trial court fails to rule on a motion for reconsideration filed prior to the entry of a final 
judgment, the motion for reconsideration is deemed to have been denied. Id. citing State v. 
Wolfe, 158 Idaho 55, 61, 343 P.3d 497, 503 (2015). In this situation, Canyon Outdoor’s Motion 
for Reconsideration was filed after the trial court entered the Judgment.   
Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 11(a)(2)(B) allowed two separate approaches to filing 
                                            
1 I.R.C.P. 11(a)(2)(B) is similar to I.R.C.P. 11.2(b)(1) which became effective July 1, 2016.  
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motions to reconsider interlocutory order. Agrisource, Inc. v. Johnson, 156 Idaho 903, 911, 332 
P.3d 815, 823 (2014). Parties could either file a motion to reconsider before a final judgment was 
entered or file a motion to reconsider within fourteen days after entry of a final judgment. Id. 
Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 11(a)(2)(B) provided a party one more chance after entry of a final 
judgment to ask the court to decide the law and facts correctly. Id. at 913, 825. This additional 
opportunity after entry of a final judgment “ensures the district court decides a case on the proper 
law and facts.” Id. Canyon Outdoor’s Motion for Reconsideration requested reconsideration of 
the trial court’s Memorandum Decision and Order Re: Cross Motions for Summary Judgment 
and was filed within 14 days of entry of the trial court’s Judgment. Accordingly, Canyon 
Outdoor’s Motion for Reconsideration is similar to the second motion for reconsideration filed 
by Appellant in Agrisource, Inc. v. Johnson. See Id. at 912, 824. The Idaho Supreme Court 
determined that the Appellant’s second motion for reconsideration “was proper because (1) it 
moved the court to reconsider the court’s orders on summary judgment and [Appellant’s] first 
motion to reconsider, which were both interlocutory orders; and (2) [Appellant] made it within 
fourteen days of the June 14, 2012 Judgment, which was a final judgment.” Id.  
The fact that the trial court’s Memorandum Decision and Order Re: Cross Motions for 
Summary Judgment and the Judgment were entered on the same day does not change the 
interlocutory nature of the Memorandum Decision and Order Re: Cross Motions for Summary 
Judgment. “When an order granting summary judgment is filed before a final judgment, that 
order is an interlocutory order.” Id. at 911, 823. In addition to the Memorandum Decision and 
Order Re: Cross Motions for Summary Judgment and the Judgment being two separate 
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documents, the Memorandum Decision and Order Re: Cross Motions for Summary Judgment 
cannot be considered a final judgment by itself. Pursuant to Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 54(a), 
a final judgment is not permitted to contain the court's legal reasoning, findings of fact, or 
conclusions of law. I.R.C.P. 54(a). The trial court’s Memorandum Decision and Order Re: Cross 
Motions for Summary Judgment consists of the very elements that a final judgment is prohibited 
from containing. R., pp. 201-208.  
In addition, Canyon Outdoor was not required to assert or present facts in the summary 
judgment proceeding in order for the trial court to be required to consider those facts when 
Canyon Outdoor presented them in conjunction with its Motion for Reconsideration. Whether 
the information submitted by Canyon Outdoor with its Motion for Reconsideration would have 
been timely pursuant to Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 56(c), is not the appropriate standard for 
consideration of whether the trial court was required to consider the information submitted by 
Canyon Outdoor. See Kepler-Fleenor v. Fremont Cty., 152 Idaho 207, 211, 268 P.3d 1159, 1163 
(2012). In Kepler-Fleenor v. Fremont Cty., the Idaho Supreme Court determined that it was 
improper to strike an affidavit submitted in support of a motion for reconsideration on the basis 
that it was untimely under Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 56. Id. Rather, Idaho Rule of Civil 
Procedure 11(a)(2)(B) governed the submission of the affidavit. Id. As such, Idaho Rule of Civil 
Procedure 11(a)(2)(B) rather than Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 56(c) governed the trial court’s 
consideration of the new and additional information Canyon Outdoor brought to the trial court’s 
attention in conjunction with Canyon Outdoor’s Motion for Reconsideration. Id. In addition, 
Nettleton did not move to strike the new and additional information Canyon Outdoor brought to 
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the trial court’s attention in the Plaintiff’s Verified Response to Defendant’s Motion for 
Reconsideration and is not entitled to do so now. R., pp. 403-409. 
B. THE FEBRUARY 28, 2014 COMMISSION RATE MODIFICATION AGREEMENT 
DID NOT CONSTITUTE THE ENTIRE AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE PARTIES 
Nettleton mischaracterizes the significance of the February 28, 2014 Agreement. The 
February 28, 2014 Agreement modified a single term of the employment agreement between 
Nettleton and Canyon Outdoor, the rates at which the variable portion of Nettleton’s 
compensation was determined. R., p. 65 at ¶14. The February 28, 2014 Agreement was not the 
entire agreement between Canyon Outdoor and Nettleton, it did not address the base component 
of Nettleton’s compensation and it did not address Nettleton’s duties with Canyon Outdoor. Id. 
The February 28, 2014 Agreement could not have been the entire agreement between Canyon 
Outdoor and Nettleton because it did not address the services Nettleton actually performed for 
Canyon Outdoor and for which Canyon Outdoor paid Nettleton a significant portion of his 
overall compensation, at least $38,000.00 over the course of Nettleton’s time with Canyon 
Outdoor. R., pp. 63-65.  More importantly, the February 28, 2014 Agreement did not create an 
obligation for Canyon Outdoor to pay Nettleton commission relating to “new contracts” after 
Nettleton terminated his employment with Canyon Outdoor. R., p. 65 at ¶14.  
It is important to carefully use the word “commission” when analyzing whether Nettleton 
is entitled to post-termination compensation. Nettleton received a fixed component of 
compensation and variable component of compensation. R., p. 65 at ¶12. The variable 
component of compensation was not a commission in the sense that Nettleton could obtain an 
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advertiser for Canyon Outdoor and then never interact with that advertiser again. R., pp. 30, 37, 
45, and 63-65. At a minimum, there was an evidentiary conflict regarding this issue that could 
not be resolved without the consideration of witness credibility.  
Nettleton had the burden of proving that his agreement with Canyon Outdoor included a 
term that required payment of the variable portion of compensation after Nettleton terminated his 
employment. However, the only evidence in the record was Nettleton’s subjective belief that he 
was entitled to receive compensation after he terminated his employment. R., p. 35 and 43.  
Nettleton testified that the February 28, 2014 agreement did not entitled him to the variable 
portion of his compensation after his resignation. R., p. 43. Nettleton also testified that post-
separation payment of the variable portion of his compensation was not offered or promised to 
him by Canyon Outdoor. R., p. 35. Yet Nettleton asserts that because he believed he was entitled 
to post-separation compensation that he is entitled to it. Nettleton’s subjective belief that he was 
entitled to compensation following his resignation is not sufficient. R. p. 89; See J.R. Simplot Co. 
v. Bosen, 144 Idaho 611, 614, 167 P.3d 748, 751 (2006). As previously addressed in Appellant’s 
Brief, the trial court erred when it determined that Nettleton had established a “course of 
dealing” that established Nettleton was entitled to post-separation compensation. R. p. 207. In 
this situation, the parties had not previously applied the term of the employment agreement upon 
which Nettleton seeks to enforce and as such could not create a “course of dealing.” Pocatello 
Hosp., LLC v. Quail Ridge Med. Inv'r, LLC, 156 Idaho 709, 721, 330 P.3d 1067, 1079 (2014)  
Even if Nettleton was able to demonstrate from the record that he was entitled to post-
separation compensation, it was improper for the trial court to infer that there was no 
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requirement for Nettleton to service contracts in order to be entitled to compensation.  R., p. 207. 
The information before the trial court was the written testimony of Curtis Massood that Nettleton 
was required to service contracts and the written testimony of Nettleton that he was not required 
to service contracts. R. pp. 62-67, 88-91, 152-153. This constitutes an evidentiary conflict 
analogous to the evidentiary conflict addressed by the Idaho Court of Appeals in Argyle v. 
Slemaker. Argyle v. Slemaker, 107 Idaho 668, 670, 691 P.2d 1283, 1285 (Ct. App. 1984). There 
the Idaho Court of Appeals determined that summary judgment was inappropriate when an 
evidentiary conflict could not be resolved without the consideration of witness testimony. Id. 
Specifically, the Idaho Court of Appeals held that “such a determination should not be made on 
summary judgment if credibility can be tested by testimony in court before the trier of fact.” Id. 
The conflicts between Curtis Massood and Nettleton’s testimony could not be resolved without 
the trial court implicitly considering the witnesses’ credibility. Accordingly, it was not 
appropriate for the trial court to resolve this evidentiary conflict at summary judgment. 
 
C. THE TRIAL COURT FAILED TO ACT PURSUANT TO IDAHO CODE SECTION 
45-612 
 
Canyon Outdoor was required to defend against Nettleton’s false claim for compensation 
based on “renewal contracts.” Not only did the trial court err by failing to award Canyon 
Outdoor its attorney’s fees and costs incurred defending against Nettleton’s claim for 
compensation based on “renewal contracts”, but the trial court awarded Nettleton attorney’s fees 
which included attorney’s fees incurred by Nettleton pursuing a false claim. R., p. 433. Idaho 
Code Section 45-612(2) did not allow the trial court the discretion to deny Canyon Outdoor an 
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award of the attorney’s fees and costs incurred defending against Nettleton’s false claim. I.C. § 
45-612. Idaho Code Section 45-612(2) provides as follows: 
Any employee initiating a civil proceeding to collect unpaid wages or other 
compensation, which is based in whole or in part on a false claim which the 
employee knew to be false at the time the employee brought the action, shall 
be liable for attorney’s fees and costs incurred by the employer in defending 
against the false claim.  
 
I.C. § 45-612(2). Regardless of whether Nettleton had a subjective belief that he was entitled to 
post-separation compensation, Nettleton signed the February 24, 2014 Agreement. R., p. 33. 
Moreover, Nettleton received compensation from Canyon Outdoor for over a year utilizing the 
tiered rate structure set forth by the February 24, 2014 Agreement. R., pp. 248-271. There were 
several months during that time in which Nettleton was not entitled to commission relating to 
“renewal contracts” pursuant to that tiered rate structure. R., pp. 252, 256, 258, 264, 265, and 
266. Any argument that he was somehow unaware of how the commission tier structure set forth 
by the February 24, 2014 Agreement operated when he filed the Verified Complaint is 
disingenuous.   
Nettleton’s assertion that he “did not raise a specific claim for compensation in the form 
of commissions due from ‘renewal contracts’” in the Respondent’s Brief does not reflect the 
actual language of Nettleton’s Verified Complaint or Amended Verified Complaint. 
Respondent’s Brief at 18. Paragraphs 4 to 9 of Nettleton’s Verified Complaint and Amended 
Verified Complaint allege as follows: 
4. During such employment, Employee was a salesman for Employer, procuring 
new and renewing contracts with third-party advertisers for advertising on 
Employer's billboards.  
 
APPELLANT’S REPLY BRIEF - 9 
 
5. Employee was paid a base salary and commissions on his sales.  
 
6. Employee's commissions were based on a percentage of the gross revenue from 
each of the new or renewing contracts he procured, and paid on a monthly basis 
as each advertiser paid on its contract over its term.  
 
7. The terms of some of the contracts Employee had procured had not expired at 
the time of his separation, and the advertisers have continued to make monthly 
payments thereon to Employer after Employee's separation.  
 
8. Employee is entitled to his commissions on these contracts, in at least the total 
amount of $24,047.50; and such portion thereof as is attributable to the 
advertisers' payments made on such contracts to date is due and payable now, and 
the remainder shall be due and payable upon receipt by Employer.  
 
9. Such commissions are part of Employee's financial compensation for his labor 
and services on behalf of Employer and constitute "wages" within the meaning of 
Idaho Code Section 45-601. 
 
R., pp. 10-11(emphasis added). Nettleton’s Verified Complaint and Amended Verified 
Complaint specifically alleged that he was entitled to post-separation compensation based on the 
new and renewing contracts he procured. Id. Moreover, the discovery requests Nettleton 
submitted to Canyon Outdoor incorporated two exhibits, one that addressed “renewal contracts” 
and one that addressed “new contracts”. R., p. 233; R., pp. 386-387; R., p. 410. Exhibit A was a 
list of “renewal contracts” that Nettleton asserted were contracts he procured with existing 
customers of Canyon Outdoor and from which he sought compensation from Canyon Outdoor. 
R. pp. 382-385; R., p. 410. Nettleton required Canyon Outdoor to provide information relating to 
payments received from Canyon Outdoor’s advertisers for the “renewal contracts” listed on 
Exhibit A. R., pp. 386-387; R., p. 410.  Nettleton continued to deny that he was not entitled to 
commissions relating to “renewal contracts” in January of 2016. R, pp. 376 and 388. Nettleton’s 
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counsel finally conceded at the hearing on the motion for summary judgment that Nettleton was 
not entitled to commission on renewal contracts and that they were there “just to talk about the 
new contracts”. Tr., pp.9-10, ll. 23-25 and 1-2. 
Whether or not Nettleton sought compensation for “renewal contracts” in his Cross 
Motion for Summary Judgment, does not alter the fact that $24,047.50 sought in the Verified 
Complaint and Amended Verified Complaint included $8,433.75 in compensation relating to 
renewal contracts or Canyon Outdoor’s successful defense of Nettleton’s false claim. R., pp. 
379-388; R., p. 392; R., p. 410. Nettleton did not acknowledge that he was not entitled to 
compensation based on “renewal contracts” until after Canyon Outdoor’s motion for summary 
judgment was filed. It is also important to consider that Nettleton’s counsel responded only that 
he was in agreement with Canyon Outdoor’s position as to renewal contracts. Tr., pp.9-10, ll. 23-
25 and 1-2. Nettleton’s counsel did not deny that Nettleton had previously been seeking 
compensation based on the renewal contracts.” Id.  Regardless of the Court’s determination as to 
whether Nettleton prevailed on his claim for compensation relating to “new contracts”, Canyon 
Outdoor prevailed as to Nettleton’s false claim for compensation relating to “renewal contracts” 
and was entitled to an award of its attorney’s fees and costs incurred in defending against the 
false claim. I.C. § 45-612(2).  
In addition, it was an abuse of the trial court’s discretion to enter an award of attorney’s 
fees in Nettleton’s favor that included attorney’s fees incurred relating to the pursuit of the claim 
for compensation relating to “renewal contracts.” This position is not based on Nettleton’s failure 
to segregate attorney’s fees for the claim relating to new contracts for which the trial court 
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determined that Nettleton prevailed. Rather, this position is based upon the policy set forth by 
Idaho Code Section 45-612(2). I.C. § 45-612(2). Idaho Code Section 45-612 would not provide 
its intended effect of reimbursing employers for the successful defense of a false claim if the 
employee that brought the false claim is awarded attorney’s fees incurred in bringing the false 
claim. Id. The issue before this Court is whether the trial court properly exercised its discretion. 
This Court “must consider (1) whether the trial court correctly perceived the issue as one of 
discretion; (2) whether the trial court acted within the outer boundaries of its discretion and 
consistently with the legal standards applicable to the specific choices available to it; and (3) 
whether the trial court reached its decision by an exercise of reason.” Smith v. Mitton, 140 Idaho 
893, 902, 104 P.3d 367, 376 (2004)(internal citations omitted). In this situation, the trial court 
was required to consider Idaho Code Section 45-612 in addition to the factors set forth in Idaho 
Rule of Civil Procedure 54(e). 
V. CONCLUSION 
 
Canyon Outdoor respectfully requests that the Court reverse the trial court’s 
determination that Canyon Outdoor was not entitled to summary judgment, the trial court’s 
determination that Nettleton was entitled to summary judgment, the trial court’s determination 
that Canyon Outdoor was not entitled to an award of costs and attorney’s fees, and the trial 
court’s determination that Nettleton was entitled to an award of costs and attorney’s fees. 
Canyon Outdoor also requests an award of its costs and attorney’s fees on appeal as the 
prevailing party on appeal.   
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DATED this 27th day of June, 2017. 
      WORST, FITZGERALD & STOVER, PLLC 
 
 
      By:  /s/ Louis V. Spiker _____________ 
Louis V. Spiker 
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